Minimum Slaughter Weight Regulation in Cattle Markets: Evidence from Argentina
with Federico Sturzenegger and Franco M. Vazquez. Submitted. M.A. thesis.
A minimum slaughter weight forbids slaughtering animals below a legal threshold, a rule meant to raise meat production. We evaluate it in a Faustmann competitive equilibrium with endogenous breeding, a binding land constraint, and two technologies, calibrated to Argentina. With a single technology, discounting makes producers slaughter below the supply-maximizing weight, so a moderate floor raises supply. The supply gain is small, and once the transition through the cattle cycle is priced, the floor delivers no welfare gain. With pasture and feedlot sharing the market, equilibrium slaughter weights are 408 and 346 kg. A uniform 420–450 kg floor can cut welfare by 13.2–18.8% of revenue in present value where cattle is the dominant land use, because feedlot output losses dominate pasture gains. Argentina's floor did not bind the representative producer, so the 2026 repeal carried effectively zero welfare cost and a tighter one would have been harmful. As middle-income agriculture turns dual, a capital-intensive segment beside a land-intensive one, a uniform instrument written for a single technology misfires once that structure takes hold.
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